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Substantive Retroactive Remedial rax Legislation and 
the Statute of Limitations 
Since 1953, Congress has enacted at least forty-eight retroactive 
amendments to the revenue laws,1 thirty-nine of which have provided 
for substantive remedial change.2 While nine of these thirty-nine 
amendments have contained specific provisions for extending the 
limitations period, 3 sixteen have retroactively amended substantive 
law applicable to years normally barred by the statute of limitations 
but have not contained a provision extending the limitations period.~ 
The question is thus raised whether a provision, silent as to its proce-
dural effect, implicitly repeals or modifies the applicable statute of 
limitations on claims for refunds brought under the retroactive 
change in the law. 
Because of the number of retroactive amendments which do not 
specifically provide for a change in the limitations period and because 
many taxpayers have been affected by these amendments, the prob-
lem of construing their procedural effect has been a recurring one. 
This interpretative problem resulted in conflicting decisions in the 
federal courts. In Tobin v. United States,5 the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit held that a retroactive remedial amendment6 was 
simply a codification of the existing law and, therefore, taxpayer's 
refund claim was barred by the statute of limitations even though 
I. Brief for Petitioner, p. 15, United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59 (1963). 
2. The nine that made no change in substantive law extended, for varying periods 
up to a year from date of enactment, the time for filing a claim or suit for refund, 
e.g., Technical Changes Act of 1953, ch. 512, § 211, 67 Stat. 625; Act of August 1, 1956, 
ch. 857, 70 Stat. 917; Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1657, 26 U.S.C. § 
20ll(c); Technical Amendments Act of 1958, §§ 96, 98, 72 Stat. 1672, 1673. See also 
note 39 infra. 
3. Revenue Act of 1962, §§ 26-27, 76 Stat. 1067; Act of September 14, 1960, § 5, 
74 Stat. 1013; Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1611, 26 U.S.C. § 172; 
Technical Amendments Act of 1958, §§ 92, 93, 100, 72 Stat. 1667, 1668, 1673; Technical 
Changes Act of 1953, ch. 512, § 207, 67 Stat. 623, all extending the period for filing re-
fund claims for 6 months or 1 year after date of enactment. See also note 40 infra. 
Act of February 15, 1956, ch. 36, 70 Stat. 15, provided for a 7-year limitations exten-
sion. Cf. note 67 infra and accompanying text. 
4. Revenue Act of 1962, § 30, 76 Stat. 1069; Act of June 27, 1961, §§ 1, 4, 75 Stat. 120; 
Act of September 14, 1960, § 5, 74 Stat. 1019; Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 
§ 103, 72 Stat. 1675; Act of February 11, 1958, 72 Stat. 3; Act of February 11, 1958, 
72 Stat. 4; Act of June 29, 1956, ch. 464, § 3, 70 Stat. 404; Act of February 20, 1956, 
ch. 66, 70 Stat. 26; Act of February 20, 1956, ch. 63, § 1, 70 Stat. 23; Act of January 28, 
1956, 70 Stat. 8, 26 U.S.C. § 37; Act of August 11, 1955, ch. 808, 69 Stat. 693; Act of 
August 9, 1955, § 1, 69 Stat. 625; Technical Changes Act of 1953, ch. 512, § 209, 67 
Stat. 624; Act of August 7, 1953, ch. 346, § 3, 67 Stat. 471. See also note 12 infra. 
Other retroactive amendments provided for taxpayer elections which would deter• 
mine tax treatment for certain specific past years. 
5. 264 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1959). 
6. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(q), added by ch. 464, § 1, 70 Stat. 404 (1956). 
Section 117(q) is set out at note 19 infra. 
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the legislation had been enacted after the applicable limitations 
period on his refund claim had run.7 The Sixth Circuit in United 
States v. Dempster,8 construing the same remedial amendment, also 
ruled against the taxpayer, citing Tobin. In both of these cases, the 
taxpayers had argued that the remedial amendment created a claim 
against the government, thereby taking the suits out of the normally 
applicable three-year limitation period and entitling them to the 
six-year limitation period which is applicable to general claims 
against the govemment9 or, alternatively, that the provision im-
pliedly extended the applicable limitation period for refund claims 
grounded upon the retroactive change in the law. On the other hand, 
in Hollander v. United States10 and Zacks v. United States, 11 decisions 
were rendered in the taxpayers' favor. The Second Circuit, in 
Hollander, held that the remedial legislation12 was so obviously for 
the benefit of all taxpayers qualifying under its substantive provisions 
that it impliedly suspended the normal limitations period.13 Simi-
larly, in Zacks, the Court of Claims found for the taxpayer on the 
ground that otherwise most of the claims brought under the retro-
active provision14 would have been barred by the applicable three-
year statute of limitations.15 
7. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 322(b), 53 Stat. 91, provides in pertinent part that 
allowable claims for refund must be filed within 3 years from the time the retum 
was filed or within 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of the periods 
expires later; and if no retum is filed, no refund will be allowed unless claim is filed 
within 2 years from the time the tax was paid. 
8. 265 F.2d 666 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 819 (1959) (also dealing with 
§ 117(q)). See Tobin v. Tomlinson, 310 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1962); Vaughn v. United 
States, 181 F. Supp. 386 (S.D. Cal. 1959). 
9. 28 U.S.C. § 240l(a) (1958) provides: "Every civil action commenced against 
the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after 
the right of action first accrues ..•• " The argument is that retroactive remedial legis-
lation creates a claim against the govemment for taxes paid under the provision prior 
to amendment which are in excess of those which would have been owed if the retro-
active amendment had been effective at the time the taxes were paid. 
10. 248 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1957). 
11. 150 Ct. Cl. 814, 280 F.2d 829 (1960), rev'd, United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59 
(1963). 
12. Revenue Act of 1951, § 607, 65 Stat. 567, a retroactive amendment providing 
relief for the estates of certain decedents dying between 1937 and 1939. 
13. Hollander v. United States, 248 F.2d 247, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1957). This reasoning 
is typically used by courts that have taken the general position that all substantive 
retroactive legislation is by its nature remedial, i.e., for the benefit of all taxpayers 
who qualify for refund, and have consequently refused to -treat as controlling the 
fact that some claims for refund are barred by the statute of limitations on the date 
of enactment or shortly thereafter. 
14. Note 6 supra. 
15. Zacks v. United States, 150 Ct. Cl. 814, 280 F.2d 829 (1960). See Smith v. 
United States, 304 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963) (by impli-
cation) (refund of income tax under § 117(q)); Lorenz v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 
751! 296 F.2d 746 (1961) (refund of income tax under § 117(q)); Eastman Kodak Co. v. 
United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 256, 292·F.2d 901 (1961) (refund of excise taxes); Verckler v. 
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In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court reviewed the Court of 
Claims decision in Zacks and examined at length the reasoning 
underlying the conflicting decisions of the lower federal courts.16 In 
Zacks, taxpayer had received royalties of about thirty-seven thousand 
dollars in 1952 on patents, all substantial rights to which had been 
transferred to a manufacturing corporation. As required by the then 
prevailing administrative position, the royalties were reported as 
ordinary income17 in the 1952 joint federal income tax return filed 
by taxpayer and her husband. Because the last payment of this tax 
was made in 1953, the statute of limitations would normally have 
barred any claims for refund concerning the year in question that 
were asserted after 1956.18 In 1958, taxpayer filed a claim for a pro 
tanto refund of the 1952 tax under section 117(q) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1939.19 This section of the Code was added in 1956 
to provide for retroactive relief by allowing long-term capital gains 
treatment of amounts received in any taxable year beginning after 
May 31, 1950, for the transfer of qualifying patent rights, regardless 
of the year in which the transfer occurred. The Commissioner took 
no action on the claim, so taxpayer brought a refund suit in the 
Court of Claims. After granting taxpayer's motion to strike the 
United States' asserted defense that the claim was barred by the 
statute of limitations,20 the Court of Claims entered judgment on the 
United States, 145 Ct. Cl. 252, 170 F. Supp. 802 (1959) (refund of estate tax), all hold-
ing that the applicable retroactive relief statute gave rise to a constructive "payment" 
of the tax upon the date of enactment and that the normal limitations period would 
begin to run from the time of this constructive payment. Cf. note 7 supra. 
16. United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59 (1963). 
17. Although during this period court decisions distinguished between "amateur" 
and "professional" inventors with regard to tax treatment of royalties received for 
patent transfers, it would appear that the taxpayer was a "professional" inventor 
and, under the then prevailing administrative position and case law, had properly 
reported the royalties as ordinary income. See note 29 infra. 
18. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 322(b), 53 Stat. 91. See note 7 supra. 
19. Ch. 464, § I, 70 Stat. 404 (1956). Section 117(q) provides: 
"(q) TRANSFER OF PATENT RIGHTS--
"(!) General Rule.-A transfer (other than by gift, inheritance, or devise) of 
property consisting of all substantial rights to a patent, or an undivided interest 
therein which includes a part of all such rights, by any holder shall be con-
sidered the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 6 months, 
regardless of whether or not payments in consideration of such transfer are-
" (A) payable periodically over a period generally coterminous with the 
transferee's use of the patent, or 
"(B) contingent on the productivity, use or disposition of the property 
transferred. 
(4) Applicability.-This subsection shall apply with respect to any amount re-
ceived, or payment made, pursuant to a transfer described in paragraph (I) in 
any taxable year beginning after May 31, 1950, regardless of the taxable year in 
which such transfer occurred." 
• ~O. This ~efense. was based o~ INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 7422(a) which, by pro-
VI<i!ng that no suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court • • • until a 
clarm for refund or credit has been duly filed . . . , according to the provisions of 
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merits for taxpayer.21 On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed,22 
holding that Congress, in enacting section 117(q), intended only to 
terminate litigation then pending and taxpayer's claim for refund 
was barred by limitations. The result of this decision is that only four 
groups of taxpayers are entitled to the remedial benefits of section 
117(q):23 (1) those who filed no returns at all for the years involved; 
(2) those who filed returns, but failed to pay their taxes; (3) those 
who filed returns contrary to law (if they were in a "trade or busi-
ness"2¼) or contrary to the prevailing treasury viewpoint (if they were 
"non-professional" patent-holders25); and (4) those whose returns re-
mained open by implied or express agreement, such as waiver or 
extension. The great majority of taxpayers who would otherwise 
qualify for the remedial benefits of this substantive retroactive 
amendment are, therefore, barred by the statute of limitations be-
cause they have not kept these tax years open. 
There is no language in section 117(q) that specifically provides 
for the application of the statute of limitations to refund claims al-
ready barred when it was enacted into law.26 Moreover, the adminis-
trative and legislative backgrounds of section 117(q) also are silent as 
to the effect of this section on the statute of limitations.27 However, 
the Supreme Court did not draw conclusive presumptions from 
this lack of legislative and administrative comment or the failure 
to provide for a specific limitations period, but rather, the Court 
first examined the purpose behind the enactment. In 1946, the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue announced his acquiescence in 
Edward C. Myers,28 a Tax Court case which held that, as to an "ama-
law in that regard," arguably incorporated the limitation period of § 322{b) of the 
1939 Code for the filing of refund claims under § 117(q). 
21. Zacks v. United States, 150 Ct. CI. 814, 280 F.2d 829 (1960). The Government 
argued that § 117(q) was enacted only to terminate then pending litigation, i.e., claims 
not barred on the date of its enactment. But the court held that the amendment 
was not so limited in purpose on its face and to hold taxpayer barred by limitations 
would be to attribute an "idle gesture" to Congress since the act applies to years 
as far back as 1950. 280 F.2d at 831. The parties stipulated the remaining issues, 
with the Government reserving the right to appeal the overruling of its motion. 
22. Mr. Justice Black dissented, agreeing with the court below, and Mr. Justice 
Douglas did not participate in the decision. 
23. These four groups of taxpayers are able to use § 117(q) because, through the 
various methods mentioned in the text, they have managed to keep open tax years 
that would otherwise be closed by the statute of limitations. Cf. United States v. 
Zacks, 375 U.S. 59 (1963). "[T]he amending provisions of § 117(q) are fully effective 
with respect to years and claims not barred." Id. at 70. See generally Walter, Tax 
Refund Problems for Patent Owners, 40 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 674, 676 (1958). 
24. See text accompanying note 44 infra. 
25. See text accompanying note 31 infra. 
26. See note 19 supra. 
27. See S. REP. No. 1941, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4.5 (1956); H.R. REP. No. 1607, 84th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1956). 
28. 6 T.C. 258 (1946). 
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teur" inventor,29 the transfer by exclusive license of all substantial 
rights under a patent was a sale or exchange of a capital asset and 
could be treated as capital gain, even though consideration for the 
license took the form of conditional royalties based on a percentage 
of the sale and was to be paid annually.30 However, the Commissioner 
withdrew this acquiescence in 1950, declaring that after May 31, 
1950, royalties measured or paid in installments as in Myers would 
be taxed as ordinary income.31 The Commissioner adhered to this 
position, despite its subsequent rejection by several courts.32 While 
the enactment of the 1954 Code prospectively settled the issue in 
favor of the taxpayer by declaring such income to be a capital gain,88 
in 1955 the Commissioner issued a further ruling declaring that he 
would adhere to his 1950 position for those tax years beginning after 
May 31, 1950, when his acquiescence in the Myers decision was with-
drawn, and prior to the enactment of section 1235 in 1954.34 Thus, 
the Commissioner's position covering this period was inconsistent 
with the application of the law as judicially and administratively 
enunciated by the Myers case and the Commissioner's acquiescence 
in 1946. The enactment of section 117 ( q) was intended to cure this 
inconsistency35 by providing relief, retroactive to 1950, which was 
similar to that prospectively established in the 1954 Code. However, 
this history, by itself, does not reveal whether Congress intended to 
provide relief for everyone who, between 1950 and 1954, followed 
the Commissioner rather than the Myers decision, or just for the tax-
payers who kept those tax years open through one of the devices 
mentioned earlier.36 
29. An amateur inventor is one not engaged in holding patent rights primarily 
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business, as distinguished 
from a professional inventor who is so engaged. Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258, 266 
(1946). 
30. 1946-1 CuM. BuLL. 3. Prior to 1946 several courts had taken this position, e.g., 
Comm'r v. Celanese Corp., 140 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Comm'r v. Hopkinson, 126 
F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1942). 
31. Mimeo 6490, 1950-1 CUM. BULL. 9. 
32. E.g., Allen v. Werner, 190 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1951); Kronner v. United States, 
150 Ct. Cl. 817, 110 F. Supp. 730 (1953). Contra, Bloch v. United States, 200 F.2d 63 
(2d Cir. 1952). 
33. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1235. 
34. Rev. Rul. 55-58, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 97. 
35. See note 27 supra. 
36. See notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text. A statement on the floor of the 
House by Representative Cooper, then Chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee, indicated that "as a result of •.• the announced policy of the Internal 
Revenue Service to continue its insistence on its position ••• taxpayers are still con-
fronted with litigation for taxable years falling in this period in order to secure the 
rights to which the courts, with practical unanimity, have held they are entitled." 
101 C?NG. REc. 12708-09 (1956): This statement appears to be the only reference in 
the history of § 117(q) concemmg the purpose of the amendment insofar as it was 
intended to terminate litigation rather than to provide relief for all taxpayers who 
had reported qualifying royalties as ordinary income. 
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The Supreme Court also considered the fact that Congress 
frequently has provided for lifting the normal limitations bar in 
substantive retroactive remedial tax legislation,37 specifically referring 
to section 14 of the Technical Amendments Act of 1958,38 the Act 
of August 9, 1955,39 and section 2 of the Act of June 29, 1956.40 The 
last of these is another provision of the same act which was in dispute 
in the Zacks case. It went to the Conference Committee, along with 
the section ll7(q) amendment, without reference to the applicable 
statute of limitations and was there amended to provide for a special 
limitations period.41 The Court considered this "striking evidence 
... all but conclusive" that, had Congress intended to affect the 
limitations period governing section ll7(q), it would have expressly 
done so.42 
In Zacks, the taxpayer argued that section ll7(q) was intended 
to establish two other rights in addition to overturning the Com-
missioner's inconsistent position for the years 1950 through 1954 and 
a refusal to grant an exemption from the existing statute of limita-
tions to claims based upon those rights would render them nugatory. 
The basis of taxpayer's contention was that section ll7(q) retro-
actively gave so-called "professional" inventors, for the first time,43 
the right to treat qualifying patent royalties as long-term capital 
gain.44 In addition, the provision eliminated any necessary holding 
period to qualify for this treatment.45 In construing the statute, the 
Supreme Court concluded that Congress did not intend to establish 
these two retroactive rights; rather, the broad scope of section 117 ( q) 
resulted because Congress merely iterated the language used in 
section 1235 of the 1954 Code.46 Thus, the Court held that the sole 
37. See note '!, supra. 
38. 72 Stat. 1611, 26 U.S.C. §§ 172(£)(3)•(4), (g){3) (1958). This provided a 6-month 
limitations period during which otherwise barred claims could be asserted under new 
rules for computing net operating loss deductions promulgated in the same act. The 
limitations provision was added to the House bill by the Senate. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1958). 
39. 67 Stat. 607 (1953). This act provided a I-year limitation period for filing 
otherwise barred claims based on § 345 of the Revenue Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 517, a 
substantive retroactive relief measure. See note 2 supra. The limitation period was 
enacted to correct legislative "oversight." H.R. REP. No. 1438, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 
1-2 (1955). 
40. Ch. 464, 70 Stat. 404 (1956), relating to taxation of certain payments received 
prior to 1950 from the United States for construction of Armed Forces facilities, ex-
pressly provides for a I-year special limitations provision. 
41. United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59, 67 (1963). 
42. Ibid. 
43. When patents had been held for sale in the ordinary course of trade or business, 
the Commissioner's position had remained constant that they were not capital assets 
as defined by !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1221 and that consideration for their sale or 
exchange constituted ordinary income. 
44. See notes 17, 19 supra. 
45. See note 19 supra. 
46. H.R. REP. No. 1607, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1·2 (1956). 
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function of section 117(q) was to overturn the Commissioner's posi-
tion; it felt this was indicated not only by the affirmative evidence 
revealed in the administrative and legislative history (including the 
selection of May 31, 1950, as the operative date of the act47), but 
also by the lack of any evidence to indicate that Congress intended 
other than to settle the large volume of pending litigation that arose 
because of the Commissioner's inconsistent ruling.48 
Arguably, Supreme Court precedent relating to general principles 
of statutory construction might have required an opposite result: 
remedial provisions should be liberally construed to give the relief 
intended;49 specific legislation should prevail over general;50 subse-
quent legislation should prevail over earlier statutes;51 and statutes 
are to be construed so as to give effect to all provisions when possible.52 
The Court brushed aside the first three of these rules on the ground 
that they were inapplicable to a statute of such "evident" limited 
purpose. As to the fourth, the Court stated that it was a "general 
principle . . . meant to guide courts in furthering the intent of the 
legislature, not in overriding it. When rigid adherence to the general 
rule would require disregard of clear indications to the contrary, 
the rule must yield."53 
Furthermore, the Court rejected taxpayer's argument that a 
decision subjecting claims that arise from section 117(q) to the 
normal statute of limitations would place a premium on taxpayer 
opposition to administrative rulings in order to keep old tax years 
open. The Court, while admitting the force of this argument in some 
contexts, declared that the argument was severely limited in this 
setting because most courts were willing to reverse the Commissioner 
even before passage of section 117(q) and because "acceptance of the 
taxpayer's argument would lead to automatic waiver of the statute 
47. "The date selected has no relevance either to the status of professional inventors 
or to the period for which patent rights must be held." United States v. Zacks, 375 
U.S. 59, 69 (1963). See text accompanying note 31 supra. 
48. United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59, 69 (1963). The existence of a substantial 
amount of such litigation was not an issue in the case. Id. at 69 n.10. A good deal 
of such litigation was pending when § 117(q) was enacted, part of which was subse• 
quently settled by payment of full refund, e.g., Goff v. United States, No. 252-56, 
Ct. Cl.; Ozai-Durrani v. United States, No. 125-37, Ct. CI.; A. M. Junt v. United 
States, No. 33687, N.D. Ohio; Hassler v. United States, No. 7359, N.D. Cal.; Schlenz v. 
United States, No. 57-C-264, N.D. Ill., or by dismissal of governmental appeals, e.g., 
Beeth v. United States, No. 8399, S.D. Tex.; Comm'r v. Hudson, No. 58726, T.C.; 
King v. United States, No. 8316, S.D. Tex.; Waterson v. United States, No. 308, N.D. 
Tex. 
49. Bonwit Teller v. United States, 283 U.S. 258, 263 (1931). 
50. Missouri v. Ross, 299 U.S. 72, 76 (1936). Cf. 2 SUTIIERLAND, STATUTORY CON• 
STRUCTION § 5204 (2d ed. 1943). 
51. Oates v. First Nat'! Bank, 100 U.S. 239, 244 (1879). Cf. 2 SUTHERLAND, op. cit. 
supra note 50, § 5201 n.8. 
52. United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955); Markham v. Cabell, 
326 U.S. 404, 411 (1945). 
53. United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59, 69 (1963) (Emphasis added). 
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of limitations in every case. Whether or not this should be done is a 
matter for Congress to decide."54 
United States v. Zacks indicates that congressional failure to 
provide for a special limitations period in substantive retroactive 
remedial tax legislation does not automatically create an exemption 
from the applicable statute of limitations for refund claims based 
on that legislation; on the other hand, such failure does not, of itself, 
indicate that the normally applicable limitations period is always 
to apply since, in two particulars, the Court attempted to limit its 
decision to the facts. First, the Court stated generally that con-
gressional failure to provide expressly for a special limitations period 
does not raise the presumption that the relevant statute of limitations 
is to apply, but rather each case is to be judged ad hoc "as with all 
questions of statutory construction."55 Second, the Court indicated 
that there may be some efficacy in the argument that Congress 
intends an implied repealer whenever the retroactive legislation 
creates a "new" right, as opposed to codifying a pre-existing right. 
In this regard, taxpayer had maintained that she was a "professional" 
inventor and section 117(q) thereby created a new right for her.56 
She claimed that, prior to the enactment of section 117(q), there 
existed no right which she could have allowed to lapse, and conse-
quently, in all equity, the statute of limitations should not now bar 
her from asserting rights created for the first time by that section.57 
However, the Supreme Court said the distinction between creation 
of new rights and clarification of existing rights was not controlling 
under the facts in Zacks because Congress had evidenced its intent 
too directly to require resort to other interpretative devices.58 Thus, 
it may be that in other contexts this argument would provide suffi-
cient indication of congressional intent to convince the courts that 
they should recognize an implied exemption from the existing limita-
tions period. This would appear to be especially true when there are 
not present reasons for avoiding implied waiver as plausible as those 
evidenced in Zacks. 
Nevertheless, several additional considerations appear to place a 
heavy burden upon any barred taxpayer who attempts to take ad-
vantage of substantive retroactive legislation containing no provision 
for opening barred years. No presumption is created in favor of the 
54. Id. at 70. 
55. Id. at 66 n.8. 
56. Cf. note 44 supra and accompanying text. 
57. Brief for Respondent, passim, United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59 (1963). This 
argument is, of course, inconsistent with the position that the taxpayer had been 
prejudiced by reliance on the Commissioner's ruling. Id. at 9. Cf. text accompanying 
note 54 supra. 
58. United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59, 68 n.9 (1963). The Court of Claims made 
no finding as to whether taxpayer was an amateur or professional inventor. Ibid. 
But cf. Lorenz v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 751, 296 F.2d 746 (1961). 
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taxpayer, even though the legislation is intended to be remedial. The 
intent of Congress is to control, 59 and Congress has repeatedly demon-
strated that it is aware of the limitations problem in this context and 
is capable of lifting the bar when it deems it necessary to effectuate 
the. purposes of the amendment.60 In addition, Congress itself has, 
upon occasion, corrected the inadvertent omission of an additional 
limitations period in a remedial retroactive statute by enacting sup-
plementary legislation.61 Furthermore, allowing retroactive legisla-
tion that is silent as to its procedural effect to extend claims already 
barred could create an anomalous situation where an additional grace 
period included in the amendment could actually operate to shorten 
the time that would otherwise be available for claiming a refund. 
Such a situation would arise whenever an amendment included a spe-
cial limitations provision providing for a shorter period for claiming 
refunds than would otherwise have been implied had the statute not 
expressly incorporated a limitations period. Thus, taxpayers for 
whom Congress makes no provision for extending the statute of 
limitations may be treated more favorably than those for whom pro-
vision is expressly made. While such a result is not entirely implausi-
ble, it is patently inconsistent with the Supreme Court's stated posi-
tion that Congress and not the courts should determine limitation 
periods.62 Finally, congressional silence in this area does not invite 
judicial gap-filling, since finding an implied waiver of the statute of 
limitations may well raise more problems than the retroactive enact-
ment itself was intended to solve. If the legislation is held impliedly 
to repeal the usual limitations period, what period of limitations 
should apply: the six-year limitations period governing claims against 
the government,63 the two-year period allowed for constructive "pay-
ment" of tax,64 the three-year maximum allowed under section 322(b) 
after filing the return, 65 or even the six-month or one-year grace 
period customarily granted by Congress when it expressly reopens 
barred years?66 There would also be the question of whether the new 
period applied to all claims covered by the substantive terms of the 
retroactive amendment or only to those claims and tax years barred 
as of the date of enactment. 
Of the above factors, only the first-congressional intent as evi-
denced by frequent enactment of retroactive tax amendments that 
specifically provide for a special limitations period-was expressly 
59. See text accompanying note 54 supra. 
60. Notes 3, 38, 39, 40 supra. 
61. See, e.g., note 39 supra. 
62. See text accompanying note 54 supra. 
63. 28 U.S.C. § 240l(a) (1958). 
64. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 65ll(a); Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 322(b), 53 Stat. 91. 
65. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 322(b), 53 Stat. 91. 
66. See note 3 supra. 
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considered in United States v. Zacks. However, by holding that the 
existing indications of congressional intent dictated the decision, 
courts in the future will be initially, if not entirely, constrained from 
finding an implied repeal of existing statutes of limitations simply 
from the fact that Congress in the past has expressly provided for ex-
tending limitations periods. Moreover, if Congress mentions and 
rejects in committee a special limitations provision, the courts will 
certainly recognize the rejection as proscribing an implied exemption 
from the normally applicable limitations period. Alternatively, con-
gressional failure to mention a provision extending the limitations 
period, coupled with the frequently unique reasons for retroactive 
legislation, 67 would seem to provide clear enough indication of con-
gressional purpose to override both traditional rules of statutory 
construction and the apparent equities of taxpayer's refund claim. 
67. For explications to the effect that much, if not most, remedial tax legislation 
is enacted for the benefit of a single taxpayer or a small group of taxpayers, see Cary, 
Pressure Groups and the Revenue Code: A Requiem in Honor of the Departing 
Uniformity of the Tax Laws, 68 HARv. L. REY. 745 (1955); Surrey, The Congress and 
the Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARv. L. REY. 1145 
(1957). Under this view, Hollander v. United States, 248 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1957), could 
have easily been decided for the Government, since the remedial legislation there in 
question was enacted for the benefit of a single taxpayer, who had a timely refund 
claim filed on the date of enactment. Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 8, 9, Rice v. Broderick, 
Civil No. 632 (D.R.I. 1952). Apparently the Second Circuit was not made aware of 
these facts. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 37-39, United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59 (1963). 
